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This paper looks at longitudinal aspects of changes in Italian male earnings inequality since 
the late 1970s by decomposing the earnings autocovariance structure into its persistent and 
transitory parts. Cross-sectional earnings differentials are found to grow over the period. The 
longitudinal analysis shows that such growth is determined by the permanent earnings 
component and is due both to a divergence of earnings profiles over the working career and 
an increase in overall persistence during the first half of the 1990s. Using these estimates to 
analyse low pay probabilities shows that it became more persistent for all birth cohorts; 
consequently, the probability of repeated low pay episodes also increased during the sample 
period. When allowing for occupation-specific components in the parameters of interest, life 
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1 Introduction 
The analysis of earnings inequality has become a major topic in economics during the past 
decade. The observation of widening earnings differentials in many industrialised economies – 
most notably the US – over the last 30 years has stimulated a large body of research.
1 
Interpretations of stylised facts recurrent in this literature range from structural changes in the 
relative demand and supply of workers skills (driven by “skill-biased” technical change, 
international trade or, in the case of supply, changes in labor force composition) to arguments 
emphasising the increased competition and instability of the economic environment brought 
about by the decline in labor market institutions. Some authors, moreover, have stressed that 
rising earnings inequality may exacerbate households’ poverty and that, consequently, attention 
should be devoted to the design of policies aimed at alleviating such welfare worsening effects 
(see e.g. Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997). 
This paper analyses the evolution of Italian earnings inequality from 1979 to 1995 from a 
longitudinal perspective. Using panel data on individual male earnings, I analyse earnings 
dynamics and estimate the extent with which the development of aggregate earnings 
differentials reflects changes in long-run inequality or an increase in short term earnings 
volatility. Longitudinal investigations of earnings dynamics are useful to understand the causes 
of inequality and, consequently, to design policy measures to cope with it. Panel micro-data 
allow observation of individual earnings profiles over time and, thus, estimation of the earnings 
distribution not only at a point in time (or a sequence of them), but also between different time 
periods. Thence, evidence on the size of cross-sectional earnings differentials can be extended 
by an indication of their persistence over time. Put differently, by enabling researchers to 
observe long-run earnings, panel data makes it possible to identify a permanent earnings 
component and to measure its dispersion, distinguishing it from transitory fluctuations, for any 
given level of aggregate cross-sectional inequality. The larger the share of permanent 
dispersion, the more point in time earnings differences will persist over individual life-cycles. 
On the other hand, transitory variability implies that there is a lot of “churning” within the 
earnings distribution and that individuals observed in low earnings in a given period will 
abandon the bottom of the distribution after few years.  
The distinction between permanent and transitory components of earnings differentials 
has important implications for the understanding of changing inequality (Gottschalk, 1997). 
                                                 
1 See Levy and Murnane (1992), Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) and the contributions of Fortin and Lemieux, 
Gottschalk, and Johnson to the 1997 Symposium hosted by Journal of Economic Perspectives for surveys of the 
earnings inequality debate.  
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Widening differentials driven by the permanent earnings component could arise from 
variations in the remuneration of persistent workers attributes, say individual ability, and be 
consistent with those explanations stressing the impact of skill biased changes on the labor 
market. On the other hand, earnings volatility could be produced by labor market instability 
resulting from declining institutional protections and, more generally, from increased 
competition in the economic environment. The relevance of this distinction for policy design 
follows from observing that while transitory differentials vanish within few years, persistent 
earnings inequality is an ingredient for a more segmented distribution of households income 
and welfare, thus calling for interventions.
2 
Given the relevance of the issue for the debate on earnings inequality, it is rather 
surprising that relatively few studies have been devoted to the decomposition of earnings 
dispersion into its permanent and transitory components. Only recently researchers have begun 
to look at these longitudinal aspects of inequality applying the minimum distance technique of 
Chamberlain (1984).
3 Moffitt and Gottschalk (1995) use a sample of male heads from the 
Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID). They fit stochastic earnings processes to the 
empirical covariance structure and decompose it into its permanent and transitory parts, in 
order to understand which is the driving force behind trends in the US widening earnings 
distribution. They find that the two earnings components equally contributed to the growth of 
earnings inequality during the 1970s and 1980s.
4 Baker and Solon (1998) apply minimum 
distance techniques to longitudinal tax records on Canadian men and look at the implied 
decomposition of trends in inequality into permanent and transitory components. Similarly to 
the US study, they find that the two earnings component play an equal role in determining 
changes in inequality. Evidence for the UK is reported by Dickens (2000). He uses panel data 
from the New Earnings Survey (NES) to assess the contribution of the two earnings 
components to upward trends in British earnings dispersion from the mid-1970s to the mid-
1980s. His findings suggest that the rise of earnings inequality was mainly driven by 
                                                 
2 Blundell and Preston (1998) note that in the presence of risk aversion also earnings volatility could produce 
welfare worsening effects by inducing households to deviate from optimal intertemporal consumption plans. 
3 Studies of earnings dynamics unravelling the relative importance of permanent and transitory components of 
earnings from panel data have a well-established tradition. Early contributions to this literature are focused on 
characterising the earnings process using maximum likelihood methods (see Lillard and Willis, 1978, Lillard and 
Weiss, 1979, Hause, 1980, and MaCurdy, 1982). More recently Abowd and Card (1989) pioneered the application 
of the Chamberlain method to the covariance structure of earnings and use the PSID to estimate stochastic 
processes of earnings and hours. Another study of earnings dynamics applying the Chamberlain method to the 
PSID is Baker (1997). These studies, however, do not analyse the role played by earnings components in 
explaining changing inequality. 
4 In a related work (Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1994) the authors estimate the extent of changes in earnings 
instability, defined as the variance of deviations from medium term individual earnings, and find that their 
measure of volatility accounts for one third of growing US earnings dispersion.  
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permanent earnings differentials during the first half of the 1980s, while, on the other hand, 
trends over the late 1980s and early 1990s appear to be the outcome of earnings volatility. 
Similar models have also been estimated by Haider (2001) using a different PSID sample 
compared to Baker (1997) and showing that both life-time inequality and transitory variability 
contributed to aggregate US trends. 
This paper looks at earnings dynamics and inequality in Italy. Major changes in the wage 
setting framework and bargaining practices occurred in Italy throughout the period investigated 
(Baccaro, 2000). During the late 1970s, the system of wage indexation to the cost of living (the 
scala mobile) was based on compensations uniform – in absolute terms - over the wage 
distribution. Reforms of this system towards proportionality took place since the first half of 
the 1980s, while any form of automatic indexation was abolished by the income policies round 
of 1992. Also, since the mid-1980s the relevance of firm level bargaining increased and 
individual wage premia were used as a mean of counteracting the compression of differentials 
induced at the central level by the egalitarian indexation system.  
Previous research on the Italian earnings distribution predominantly used cross-sectional 
micro-data to estimate the size and evolution of earnings differentials.
5 Ericksson and Ichino 
(1995) show that earnings inequality decreased over the late 1970s and the first part of the 
1980s, while a re-opening of differentials is apparent thereafter. They stress that while the 
compression of differentials was induced by the egalitarian nature of wage indexation, opposite 
trends were imparted at the firm level (the so-called wage drift) since the mid-1980s. 
Dell’Aringa and Lucifora (1994) reach similar conclusions. Using firm level data they observe 
wage inequality to start rising since the first half of the 1980s, and point towards the relevance 
of individual productivity premia paid at the firm level to skilled non-manual workers to 
explain these trends. Manacorda (1997) also produces evidence of u-shaped inequality trends 
between the late 1970s and the early 1990s and shows that the recent reforms of wage 
indexation determined real wage losses for workers in the bottom end of the earnings 
distribution.  
The results of this paper reproduce, to some extent, these patterns of aggregate inequality 
and add longitudinal insights to the existing evidence on the Italian distribution of earnings. I 
find that aggregate inequality rises since the early 1980s up until the mid-1990s, the end of the 
period observed. For all birth cohorts analysed, growing differentials are driven by the 
                                                 
5 An exception is the work of Bigard et al. (1998) in which earnings mobility indicators are used to compare 
earnings transitions between Italy and France, showing that the Italian distribution is characterised by more 
rigidity, especially at the bottom.  
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permanent earnings component, especially over the first half of the 1990s, while younger 
cohorts are characterised by larger levels of transitory variations. Estimated models of 
permanent earnings dynamics allow for individual specific earnings profiles, similarly previous 
studies of individual earnings dynamics (see Lillard and Weiss, 1979, Hause, 1980, Baker, 
1997, Baker and Solon, 1998 and Haider, 2001). Differently from these studies, however, I find 
earnings profiles to diverge with age, implying a widening of permanent differentials over the 
working career. Also, models of this paper allow for shifts in the relative importance of 
earnings components over time, showing that permanent differentials have become 
predominant in recent years. Parameter estimates are next used to derive implications for low 
pay, showing that the rise of long term inequality translated into increasing persistence at the 
bottom end of the earnings distribution and into a growth in the probability of repeated low pay 
events. Finally, I explicitly allow for occupational effects within long term earnings profiles, 
finding that part of overall trends arise within the earnings distribution of non-manual workers. 
 
2 Data description and patterns of the earnings autocovariance structure 
This study uses longitudinal data on individual earnings made available by the Italian National 
Social Security Institute (Istituto Nazionale di Previdenza Sociale, INPS) for the 1979-95 
period. The INPS archive collects information from social security records. The administrative 
nature of the archive implies a good reliability of the earnings data but, on the other hand, the 
available information is rather limited and individual characteristics such as education and 
family background are not observed. Data refers to employees from the private non-
agricultural sector of the economy; the sample originally available is a 1% random draw 
representative of full-time workers registered in the INPS archive. Besides the individual social 
security number that allows reconstruction of the panel, information about workers consists, in 
each year, of the gross annual wage (inclusive of any over-time and extraordinary 
compensation), year of birth, gender, occupation and number of weeks worked. Information on 
the firm is also available and refers to its size, industry measured at the 3-digits level and the 
INPS code.  
For the purposes of this study, male workers aged between 25 and 58 (with the age 
variable defined as explained below) and born between 1930 and 1965 have been selected. The 
selection of men’s data is aimed at mitigating issues of endogenous female labor market 
participation, which may well be exacerbated when analysing earnings dynamics. The choice 
of the age range has the objective of selecting out the extremes of the life-cycle of earnings, 
where volatility arising just after labor market entry or before retirement can be confounded  
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with volatility due to structural labor market changes. Finally, workers born before 1930 and 
after 1965 where excluded from the analysis due to small sample size.
 6 
After applying the selection criteria outlined above, I end up with a panel covering 
67,768 individuals, with a total of 935,333 person-year observations, whose structure is 
described in Appendix Table A1. I analyse the fully unbalanced panel, i.e. use all observations 
with positive earnings and allow individuals to enter and exit the sample over time.
7 
Movements into and out from the sample can be due to unemployment spells, early retirement 
and mobility to or from the public, agricultural or self-employed sectors of the economy. While 
not formally controlling for attrition due to lack of instruments, the use of the unbalanced panel 
helps in mitigating the likely overestimation of earnings persistence that would arise from 
balanced samples in which only individuals with positive earnings in each wave contribute to 
estimation. 
In order to separately identify age and time effects it is necessary to observe earnings 
autocovariances at different phases of the life cycle in each year, which is achieved by 
estimating the covariance structure separately by birth cohorts. In order to preserve cell size 
within cohorts, observations have been grouped into 12 3-year birth cohorts. Each birth cohort 
is imputed its central age in each year: for example the birth cohort 1936-38 will be imputed 
ages 42 (in 1979) through 58 (in 1995), while birth cohort 1951-53 will be imputed ages 27 (in 
1979) through 43 (in 1995). The two oldest cohorts leave the sample altogether when they 
reach age 59 (in 1990 and 1993) while the four youngest cohorts join the sample at the age of 
25 (in 1980, 1983, 1986 and 1989). Such an unbalanced design by cohorts allows multiple 
observations on the life cycle extremes. Table A1 shows how the birth cohort structure of the 
data reflects the entry of younger cohorts into the labor market, which attenuates the 
progressive ageing of the sample with calendar time.  
The next part of the table presents the sample structure with respect to some workers’ 
characteristics. The occupational classification available in the INPS sample allows a 
distinction between blue collar workers, white collars and managers. The proportion of manual 
workers tended to decrease over time, while the relative weight of non-manuals (both white 
collars and managers) rose during the period, a fact which can both reflect occupational 
mobility of older cohorts and a higher propensity of younger cohorts to be employed in non-
                                                 
6 Besides the selection criteria mentioned in the text, top and bottom 5 observations have also been excluded from 
each tail of the cross-sectional distribution in order to improve the convergence properties of the GMM estimator. 
Such a “trimming” of observations is common practice in the literature, see Abowd and Card (1989) and Dickens 
(2000) among others. 
7 I also experimented using the revolving balanced design suggested by Haider (2001), i.e. exclude individuals 
with discontinuous earnings profiles, and found no relevant differences in results.   
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manual jobs.
8 A slight shift away from larger firms can be also observed, while the industrial 
structure tended to stay constant over time.
9  
The table presents the evolution of the standard deviation of log weekly earnings which 
resembles, to some extent, the trends of Italian earnings inequality singled out in previous 
research on Italy, see Section 1. Wage differentials dropped over the early 1980s, while after 
1982 a tendency towards a reopening of the distribution can be observed, which continues until 
the end of the observed period. A parallel with the evolution of the wage bargaining framework 
can be drawn. Falling differentials characterise the phase of fully egalitarian wage indexation, 
while, on the other hand, their reopening in the second 1980s occurs when both wage 
indexation was partially reformed towards proportionality and individual wage premia were 
used at the firm level to neutralise compressionary effects induced at the central level by wage 
indexation. Finally, the early 1990s, during which wage indexation was abolished, witness a 
further growth of earnings dispersion.  
The remainder of this section provides a preliminary exploration of the earnings 
autocovariance structure. While complementing the cross-sectional description of earnings 
differentials in Table A1 by looking at earnings persistence, such a descriptive analysis will 
provide insights on the features of earnings second moments that will prove useful when 
specifying more formal models in the next section.  
For each birth cohort I estimated the empirical covariance structure and pooled estimated 
second moments across birth cohorts. I next regressed the covariance structure on a set of 
dummy variables defined according to birth cohorts, time periods and the width of the interval 
for which covariances are estimated. While the first set of regressors is meant to capture 
variations of earnings persistence across groups that enter the sample at different stages of the 
life-cycle, time dummies allow for changes in the earnings distribution over the sample period 
and interval-width dummies control for the likely drop of earnings persistence which should be 
observed as pairs of years further apart are taken into account.  
Results from this exercise are reported in Table 1. Estimated coefficients on interval 
width are all negative and decline over lags, indicating that earnings persistence diminishes 
when years further apart are considered, meaning that the chance of movements within the 
                                                 
8 Tabulations from raw data show that the latter might be the relevant explanation: changes of occupation from 
manual to non-manual are rare in the INPS panel and around 1% of the sample changes status in each year. 
9 The rather high share of workers in the manufacturing sector (between 55% and 60%) reflects the sample 
selection criteria, in particular the restriction to full-time males, and is consistent with evidence from other micro-
data set on the Italian labor market. Slightly lower figures (around 53%) can be computed from the Survey on 
Households Income and Wealth of the Bank of Italy when the sample is restricted using the criteria of this paper 
(full-time male employees from the private sector in the indicated age and birth cohort ranges).  
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earnings hierarchy increases as the interval of observation widens. Also, the decrease is more 
pronounced for the first couple of lags, while, afterwards, a tendency to approach a long term 
level is apparent. Such a pattern could be consistent with an underlying autoregressive process 
of earnings dynamics augmented by a long run component. Evidence on calendar time 
dummies resembles findings emerging from the inspection of Table A1. Earnings variances 
and covariances fall during the early 1980s, while positive signs characterise estimated 
coefficients since 1983. In particular, the growth of earnings dispersion and persistence is 
concentrated in the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, with a marked 
increase in the last couple of years observed. Again, a parallel with the evolution of the wage 
setting framework can be drawn. Finally, evidence on birth cohort dummies shows that 
earnings autocovariances are lower for younger cohorts. This fact is consistent with two not 
mutually exclusive explanations. First, if life-cycle earnings growth is heterogeneous across 
individuals, then we should expect the size of earnings differentials to increase as we consider 
birth cohorts at later stages of the career. Second, job search models predict that recent labor 
market entrants are more likely to change job compared to their older counterparts, so that the 
observed lower persistence could result from earnings instability attached to job changes.  
 
3 Earnings dynamics, long term inequality and transitory fluctuations 
In this section I fit an earnings components model to the empirical covariance structure and use 
parameter estimates to decompose overall earnings inequality into a long term and a volatile 
component. In order to separate life cycle earnings dynamics from secular changes in 
inequality, I analyse earnings differentials within the 3 year birth cohorts defined in Section 2. 
With this aim, let us write the log of real earnings for the i-th member of birth cohort c in year 
t, yict, as the sum of a year-cohort specific mean and the individual specific deviation from it: 
C c T t t N i y y c c c ict ct ict ,..., 1 , ,..., , ,..., 1 , 0 = = = + = ω   (1) 
where  ct y  is the mean log earnings for cohort c in period t and ωict is the deviation from the 
mean.
10 Earnings differentials within each birth cohort can be characterised by modelling 
mean-adjusted earnings ωict and their covariance structure E(ωict ωic(t-k)).  
 
3.1 Specification and estimation 
I model the dynamics of mean-adjusted earnings according to the following process: 
                                                 
10 The panel length Tc and the initial year t0c are cohort specific due to the cohort-wise unbalanced panel design, 
see Section 2.   
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it t c it i i t ict v a τ λ γ µ π ω + + = ) (,   (2) 
where  ait is the age variable defined in Section 2 and E(µivit)=E(γivit)=0. The term in 
parentheses on the right hand side of (2) is formed by individual-specific time invariant 
coefficients that index the long term (or permanent) earnings component. The term vit, on the 
other hand, is individual-specific but varies in each period and represents the volatile or 
transitory earnings component. The orthogonality assumption allow separate identification of 
the two earnings component. As noted in Section 2, one reason for the lower degree of 
autocorrelation characterising younger cohorts compared to their older counterparts could 
reside in the presence of heterogeneous life-cycle earnings growth. To accommodate this 
possibility, long-term earnings deviations from the cohort mean are assumed to evolve over the 
life cycle following an individual specific linear trend.
11 The individual specific intercept µi 
represents earnings capacity at the beginning of the working life, determined by schooling or 
other time invariant ability shifters. The growth parameter, γi, captures age related earnings 
capacity, resulting, for example, from the ability to acquire skills on the job.
12 First and second 
order moments of individual specific coefficients are given by: 
)] , , ( ); 0 , 0 [( ~ ) , ( 2 2
µγ γ µ σ σ σ γ µ i i   (3) 
The two variances represent heterogeneity in time invariant and age related aspects of 
ability. A key role for assessing the development of earnings differentials over the working life 
is played by the covariance between individual specific coefficients, σµγ. A negative value of 
this coefficient implies that the two sources of heterogeneity offset each other. Within groups 
with homogeneous educational attainment (and assuming the absence of other shifters of initial 
earnings) such an outcome can be interpreted as the effect of generic on-the-job training, which 
lowers initial earnings for investors and raises their earnings growth rates (see Hause, 1980). 
Positive values of the coefficient, on the other hand, might arise when individuals with large 
initial ability (or schooling) have also a high propensity to learn skills on the job. While in the 
first case we should expect long term differentials to drop over the working life, the opposite is 
true in the second case. Estimates of this coefficient thence provide indications on the extent of 
mobility within the distribution of long-term earnings. 
                                                 
11 This type of model is usually refereed to as a profile heterogeneity or random growth model. As an alternative, 
individual specific earnings dynamics earnings could follow a random walk process, which also predicts earnings 
differentials to increase over the life-cycle (see Moffitt and Gottschalk, 1995). Baker (1997) finds evidence 
supporting the random growth against the random walk on a sample of PSID male heads of households. Baker and 
Solon (1998) model long term earnings using a mixture of the two processes. Cappellari (2000) provides evidence 
from INPS data that favours the random growth. 
12 I use age since labour market experience, actual or potential, is not observed in the INPS data.   
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In order to isolate life-cycle earnings dynamics from the secular changes in the earnings 
distribution singled out in Section 2, I allow the individual trend to be shifted by year-specific 
coefficients, πt. For example, growing earnings inequality driven by changes in the demand for 
skills will result in a rise in the πs over time. Variations in the πs affect the size of long term 
earnings differentials, but leave their hierarchy unaltered. 
The second term on the right hand side of (2) captures deviations from long-run 
components due to earnings shocks, the transitory or volatile earnings component. To allow for 
the possibility of serially correlated shocks suggested by the decline of covariance with lags 
width observed in Section 2, vit can be specified according to some low order ARMA process; 
in particular, here I adopt an AR(1) process:
13 
) , 0 ( ~ ), , 0 ( ~ , 2
0 0
2
1 σ σ ε ε ρ ε c i it it it it v v v + = − .  (4) 




ε measure shocks volatility at the start of the sample period 
and in subsequent years, respectively, while the autoregressive coefficient measures shocks 
persistence.
14 As I did for the long run component, I allow shocks to impact on earnings 
through a set of time specific shifters τt, which can capture the effect of changes in labor 
market competition and instability. Moreover, cohort specific shifters λc are also included to 
allow for the possibility that persistence differs across birth cohorts, as emerged from the 
preliminary exploration of the covariance structure in Section 2. 
Parameters of the model outlined above will be estimated by minimum distance (see 
Chamberlain, 1984, and Abowd and Card, 1989) by fitting the empirical covariance structure 
of earnings to its theoretical counterpart implied by the model. The theoretical covariance 
structure can be derived by working out second moments from the specified model of earnings 
levels. For the long term component – ω
P
ict=πt(µi+γiait) – it is given by: 
} ) ( )] ( ) ( [ { ) ( 2
) ( ) (
2




ict a a E a E a E E − − − − + + + =   (5) 
For the transitory component – ω
T
ict=λcτt(ρvit-1+εit) – the theoretical covariance structure 
is: 
                                                 
13 Experiments with ARMA(1,1) specifications failed to converge suggesting lack of identification. Baker and 
Solon (1998) report similar problems, which they solve by setting the MA coefficient to 0. As Moffitt and 
Gottschalk (1995) note, autoregressive processes are not transitory, ‘mean reverting’ being a more accurate label. 
For compactness I will still refer to transitory earnings in the remainder of the paper. 
14 The variance initial conditions of the AR(1) process is treated as an additional parameter to be estimated rather 
than assuming, as customary in time series analysis, that the process started in the infinite past. MaCurdy (1982) 
points out that the application of such time series approach to individual panel data is problematic since the 
assumption of infinite history is untenable.  
  10 
} ) ( )
~
1 ( ] ) ( [
~
{ ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( 0
2
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ict v v E d d v v E d d E − − − − − − − − + + + =   (6) 
where d0 is a dummy variable for variances in the first year of the panel (d0=1 if k=0 and t=t0c; 
d0=0 otherwise) and d
~ is a dummy variable for variances in subsequent years (d
~=1 if k=0 and 
t> t 0c;  d
~=0 otherwise). The overall theoretical covariance structure to be fitted to empirical 
second moments is the sum of (5) and (6). 
Let )] ( ),..., ( [ ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 k t iC iCt k t i t i E E f − − = ω ω ω ω ϑ   – say a column vector – be the 
theoretical covariance structure of all cohorts – a non-linear function of the parameter of 
interest  ϑ . A consistent estimator of ϑ  is obtained by minimising the squared distance 
between the theoretical covariance structure  ) (ϑ f  and its empirical counterpart m:  
)] ( [ )]' ( min[ arg ϑ ϑ ϑ f m f m − − =  (7) 
where m is the vector of dimension ( ) 1 2 / ) 1 ( × + ∑c c c T T  obtained by stacking mc over cohorts, 
mc=vech(Mc) and Mc is the empirical covariance matrix for birth cohort c.
 15  
 
3.2 Results 
Minimum distance estimates of the model resulting from (2), (3) and (4) are reported in Table 
2. Individual earnings deviations from the cohort mean of each year have been obtained as 
residuals from pooled OLS regressions of log real weekly earnings on year dummies, run 
separately by cohort. The age variable used for the estimation of second moments of individual 
earnings profiles has been constructed as described in Section 2.  
Estimated coefficients for the long run earnings component indicate that both time 
invariant and age related heterogeneity matter in the formation of long term earnings 
differentials. The advantage in terms of initial earnings levels for an individual one standard 
deviation above the mean in the distribution of µ is approximately 16%.
16 On the other hand, 
an individual located one standard deviation above the mean in the distribution of γ see his 
earnings growing 1.4% faster than the cohort mean.
17 Moreover, the positive estimate of the 
                                                 
15 This is the so-called equally weighted minimum distance estimator (EWMD), equivalent to non-linear least 
squares. Chamberlain (1984) shows that using the inverse earnings fourth moments matrix to weight the 
minimisation problem yields asymptotic efficiency. However, Altonji and Segall (1996) provide Monte Carlo 
evidence indicating that correlation in sampling errors between second and fourth moments could lead to biased 
parameter estimates, and suggest to use the EWMD. Note that the estimated covariance matrix of ϑ  produced by 
non-linear least squares routines will be biased by the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in m. I 
derive standard errors that are robust to these problems, i.e. adjusted using the fourth moments matrix V: 
1 1 ) ' ( ' ) ' ( ) ˆ var( − − = G G VG G G G ϑ , where  * | ) ( ϑ ϑ ϑ ∂ ∂ = f G  is the gradient matrix evaluated at the solution of (7). 
16 This is computed as exp(σµ)-1, where σµ is the standard deviation of µ. 
17 This is given by σγ, the standard deviation of individual growth rates.  
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covariance between intercepts and slopes implies that initial and life-cycle heterogeneity are 
positively associated, consistently with a framework in which more educated workers have also 
a high propensity to acquire skills on the job, with a resulting divergence of earnings profiles 
over the life cycle. The association between intercepts and slopes is rather strong: estimated 
coefficients imply that an individual one standard deviation above the mean in the distribution 
of µ will have a growth coefficient 87% standard deviation of γ.
18 Overall, estimated second 
moments of the coefficients of individual specific trends indicate that long term inequality 
grows over the life cycle: after 20 years of career the share of long term variance explained by 
initial heterogeneity is roughly 12%, while the rest builds up during the career as a result of 
both growth rate heterogeneity and the positive association between intercepts and slopes. 
Coefficients for the AR(1) model are precisely estimated and indicate that the variance of 
initial conditions, which represents the accumulation of shocks up to the starting year of the 
panel, is larger compared to that of subsequent innovations. Also, the autoregressive coefficient 
is rather large, signalling that shocks are highly persistent: the estimates indicate that 53% of a 
shock to the transitory component is still present after ten years. 
Calendar time loading factors for the transitory component are declining over the entire 
sample period.
19 On the other hand, time shifters on the long term component present a 
declining trend only over the first part of the sample period, when aggregate earnings 
differentials are dropping (see Table 2). After a phase of relative stability in the mid-1980s, 
long-term loading factors begin to rise and follow an upward trend up until the end of the 
period. In particular, an acceleration of such trend is evident from the last couple of panel 
waves, i.e. when automatic wage indexation was completely effective. Thence, the estimated 
loading factors suggest that the growth of aggregate earnings differentials is entirely driven by 
the long term component. Going back to the implications of variance components in explaining 
changing inequality, this result is consistent with a scenario of structural labor market changes 
in favour of skilled workers, as might result from bargaining decentralisation and reforms to 
wage indexation. 
Estimated cohort specific shifters in Table 2 indicate that earnings volatility tends to be 
larger for younger cohorts, thus confirming a pattern already emerged from the descriptive 
regression of Section 2, where autocovariances were found to be lower for younger cohorts.
20 
Differently from the descriptive regression, however, the model of this section controls for 
                                                 
18 This is obtained as σµγ/σµσγ, the linear correlation coefficient between intercepts and slopes. 
19 Loading factors on both earnings components are normalised to 1 in 1979 for identification. 
20 The shifter on birth cohort 1930-32 is normalised to 1 for identification.  
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heterogeneous life cycle earnings growth, so that the behavior of estimated coefficients can be 
imputed to differences in volatility across cohorts that could stem from differences in job 
change propensities.
21 
In order to gain an overview of the implications of these estimates for cross-sectional and 
long term earnings inequality, Figure 1 plots the predicted overall and long term variance by 
birth cohort. For all birth cohorts, earnings differentials display increasing trends since the 
early 1980s, confirming the descriptive evidence presented in Section 2 and the findings from 
previous literature on Italy. Long term inequality appears to be at higher levels the older the 
cohort considered, consistently with the evidence of life-cycle earnings divergence provided by 
the estimates of long term earnings. In addition, the incidence of long term variance on overall 
inequality tends to be larger the older the cohort considered, reflecting lower volatility. Finally, 
long term dispersion approaches overall inequality during the last years of the panel for all 
cohorts, signalling a generalised diffusion of earnings persistence. 
 
4 Implications for low pay persistence  
Estimation in the previous section was based on assumptions on the second moments of the 
earnings distribution that enabled decomposing the covariance structure into long term and 
volatile components. As Lillard and Willis (1978) showed, by making additional functional 
form assumptions on the log-earnings distribution, estimated covariance components can be 
used to investigate low pay probabilities. In particular, the probability that long term earnings 
(as opposed to total earnings) fall below some pre-determined low pay threshold can be 
computed. In addition, estimates of the intertemporal covariance structure can be used to 
retrieve the probability of repeated low pay events over sequences of time periods. Such 
exercises provide insights into the welfare implications of the estimated earnings process by 
showing to what extent the evolution of earnings differentials translates into persistent low pay, 
a symptom of labour market segmentation. 
With this aim, let us rewrite equation (1) distinguishing between permanent and 




ict ct ict y y ω ω + + =   (1.b) 
Let us define y*t as the log of the low pay threshold of year t, common to all birth 
cohorts. The probability of low pay in year t for individuals from cohort c is then : 
                                                 
21 Tabulations from raw data confirm that younger cohorts change firm more frequently compared to older groups.  
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ict ict t ict ict y y y y P − < + = = < = ω ω ω .  (8) 
By assuming bivariate normality of µi and γi and normality of εit and vi0c, it follows that 
ωict is normally distributed with variance  ) ( ) (
2 2 2 T
ict
P
ict ct E E ω ω σω + = , the variances of 
earnings components being given in (5) and (6). The probability of low pay in year t for cohort 
c is then: 
] / ) ->￿
*
ct ct t ict y y P ω σ − =   (9) 
where  Φ is the cumulative density function (c.d.f.) of the normal distribution. Pict can be 
estimated for each cohort from pooled cross-sections by regressing a low pay dummy on a set 
of time dummies by probit. Note that predictions from such regressions will be constant within 
year-cohorts cells.  
The expression in (9) refers to what Lillard and Willis (1978) define the aggregate low 
pay (poverty in their phrasing) probability, i.e. the probability that observed and both 
unobserved earnings components fall below the threshold. Hence, this probability also refers 
low pay episodes due to fluctuations of the transitory component. From the point of view of 
labor market segmentation and social welfare, it is relevant to neat low pay probabilities from 
the effect of such transitory fluctuations, providing a measure of long run low pay. This 
probability is given by: 
] / ) ->￿ ) Pr( ' * * P
ct ct t t
P
ict ct ict y y y y P ω σ ω − = < + = ,  (10) 
where  P
ct ω σ  is the standard deviation of long term earnings for cohort c in year t. P’ict can be 
estimated by evaluating Φ[ ] at the low pay probit estimates from (9) scaled by the factor 
P
ct ct ω ω σ σ / , which can be computed from estimated variance components models.  
Low pay probabilities computed according to (9) and (10) are illustrated in Figure 2. Low 
pay is defined as two-thirds the median of the male earnings distribution and is computed from 
the INPS panel. In order to allow for variation over time in the low pay threshold besides 
changes in median earnings of the estimation sample, the sample used for estimating the 
threshold has been enlarged in two directions. First, employees born in 1928 and 1929 and 
from 1966 to 1970 have been included. Second, no age constraint has been applied for 
inclusion in the sample.  
For older birth cohorts aggregate probabilities present increasing trends over the period, 
particularly during the last couple of years. Intermediate cohorts, on the other hand, present flat 
profiles: even if their within group earnings dispersion tended to increase (see Figure 1), these  
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variations were not enough to increase the likelihood of low pay, since employees from this 
cohorts are located in high earnings quantiles. For younger cohorts, finally, the low pay 
probability rises again, showing that low pay is more likely at the start of the carrier compared 
to intermediate phases. Life cycle effects are evident from the estimated probability of long 
term low pay. In particular, for older cohorts aggregate and permanent low pay profiles 
practically coincide, a result which is consistent with the positive covariance between 
intercepts and slopes of individual earnings profiles found in the previous Section: Given that 
earnings profiles diverge over the life cycle, individuals in low pay in one year at later stages of 
their career are very likely to be experiencing a long term low pay event. For younger cohorts, 
on the other hand, these effects are counteracted by the larger earnings volatility, and virtually 
none of the aggregate low pay likelihood can be ascribed to the long run component. For all 
cohorts, however, we can note that the relevance of permanent low pay increases over time, 
consistently with the rising importance of the long term component singled out in the previous 
section, and the last couple of time periods mark a sharp increase in low pay persistence for all 
cohorts. 
Minimum distance estimates can be utilised to compute the probability of repeated low 
pay over a sequence of years, providing an additional perspective on low pay persistence. In 
particular, one should expect the rise in low pay persistence singled in Figure 2 to result in an 
increase in the probability of being continuously low paid. The normality assumptions made 
above imply that ωic~NTc(0,Σc), where ωic  is the – say – column vector of mean adjusted 
earnings for individual i in cohort c,  0 is a column vector of zeros, Σc is the earnings 
autocovariance matrix implied by the model for cohort c and NTc is the multivariate normal 
distribution of dimension Tc.
22 Thence, the joint probability of a sequence of low pay states, 
say between t-k and t, is given by: 
] ˆ ; ˆ [ - 1 ct k)t c(t ￿ b − + = k kct P   (11) 
where,  k)t c(t b − ˆ  is the (k+1) vector containing estimated coefficient on year dummies from the 
pooled cross-sections low pay probit for birth cohort c  between (t-k)  and  t, 
1
ct
1 ) ˆ ( ˆ ) ˆ ( ˆ − − = 1 diag 1 diag ct ct ct ￿ ￿  is the correlation matrix of log-earnings –  ct ￿ ˆ  is the sub-
matrix of the estimated Σc referring to the [t-k, t] interval and  ) ˆ ( ct 1 diag  is the diagonal matrix 
                                                 
22 I am assuming that the earnings panel is balanced within each cohort. For individuals with discontinuous 
earnings histories, the multivariate normal distribution will be of dimensions Tc-h, where h is the number of 
“holes”. The relevant covariance matrix will be given by Σc deprived of rows and columns corresponding to such 
“holes”.  
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of the square roots of the diagonal elements of  ct ￿ ˆ  – and Φk+1 is the (k+1)-variate normal 
c.d.f..
23 It is worth nothing that the sample analogues of these probabilities can be computed 
only for individuals who are continuously observed over the k+1 years, while the arguments of 
the multivariate normal in (11) are estimated using the whole unbalanced panel: the only 
arguments of (11) that need individuals to have continuous earnings histories over the (k+1)-
year window in order to be estimated are the correlation coefficients in the off-diagonal corners 
of  ct ￿ ˆ .  
Figure 3 provides the evolution over the sample period of the estimated probability of 
being continuously low paid for 3 and 5 years. Since the probability of being continuously low 
paid decreases with the length of the interval considered, the 5-year series lies below the 3-year 
one in each of the years considered. Both series present upward trends, indicating that repeated 
low pay events have become more frequent from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s. Moreover, 
the two series tend to evolve in parallel, consistently with the fact that widening differentials 
are driven by the long term component: had the transitory earnings component had a relevant 
role, we should have observed 3-year probability to rise more rapidly compared to the 5-year 
series. Finally, the life cycle patterns observed for cross-sectional 1-year low pay in Figure 2 
are also present now, repeated low pay being more likely for cohorts at the extremes of the life 
cycle compared to intermediate groups. 
 
5 The covariates of earnings components 
With the exception of workers’ year of birth, I have made no use of the set of individual 
characteristics available in the INPS data set so far. In a sense, this approach is typical of the 
literature on the earnings covariance structure, where the focus is placed on the characterisation 
of earnings second moments through the specification of dynamic earnings processes, without 
controlling for the impact of personal characteristics on earnings persistence.
24 On the other 
hand, the vast literature on earnings inequality suggests that, for example, measures of workers 
skills different than experience (proxied here by age) can also be important in understanding 
trends depicted in the previous sections.
25 Also, institutional developments in the Italian wage 
setting framework point towards the relevance of occupational earnings differentials, as 
                                                 
23 Multivariate normal integrals are computed via simulation, in particular by applying the so-called GHK 
simulator. 
24 Typical of the literature is to consider the covariance structure of “adjusted earnings”, i.e. residuals from first 
stage regressions that include some observable attributes. Alternatively, Dickens (2000) estimates earnings 
components models within groups defined according to occupational classifications. 
25 Flinn (2001) suggests that this case might be relevant also for Italy.  
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individual wage premia were used at the firm level to counteract the compressionary effects of 
the indexation system and to re-establish differentials in favour of non-manual workers 
(Dell’Aringa and Lucifora, 1994).  
A possible strategy to assess the relevance of observable attributes consists in removing 
their impact from raw earnings. Changes in parameter estimates with respect to the previous 
sections would then reflect the features of earnings differentials between the cells defined by 
the attributes removed from raw earnings. Given the available information, I focus on 
occupation, the firm size, sectoral affiliation and inter-firm mobility and estimate cohort-
specific OLS log-earnings regressions including each of the four effects in turn, specified as 
dummies defined according to the splits reported in Table A1, fully interacted with year 
dummies. Residuals from these regressions measure deviations from the cohort-specific mean 
of a given group in each year. Estimating the covariance structure of earnings profile on these 
sets of “adjusted earnings”, however, did not always produce statistically significant parameter 
estimates for the covariance structure of earnings profiles, as could result from the reduction of 
variation in empirical moments induced by the “adjustment”.
26 I therefore proceeded by 
estimating an alternative earnings process that imposes fewer restrictions on the individual-
specific part of long term earnings, namely one in which the long-term component is constant 
over the life cycle. In order to capture variation across cohorts, I also introduce a set of cohort-
specific coefficients κs: 
it t c i t c ict v τ λ µ π κ ω + =   (2.b) 
Results from this experiment are reported in Appendix Table A2 which also includes as 
benchmark evidence from the estimation of model (2.b) on the empirical moments analysed in 
Section 2, i.e. without removing the effect of observable characteristics.
27 In this latter case, the 
growth of long term inequality is estimated to be 110% over the sample period (i.e. π1995
2-1). 
When the effect of occupation is removed from raw earnings (column 2) the heterogeneity 
                                                 
26 The variance of intercepts was estimated to be negative and with a t-ratio of 0.997 when firm size dummies 
where included in the first stage regression, while it was positive with a t-ratio of 0.234 when industry was taken 
into account. 
27 These latter results (Table A2, column 1) can also be compared with the ones from Table 2, providing insights 
on the implications of different modelling choices. There are three main differences between the two cases. First, 
the variance of individual specific intercepts is larger in Table A2, where it represents a combination of 
heterogeneity at the start and over the life cycle, rather than reflecting only initial heterogeneity as in Table 2. 
Second, estimates of calendar time shifters on the long term component are larger in Table A2, given that they 
also pick up growing dispersion over the life cycle within each cohort. Note, however, that time trends in these 
coefficients are similar in the two cases. Third, the variance of innovations is larger in Table A2. This result might 
arise from the fact that for the oldest cohort (i.e. the one used to normalise cohort specific shifters) earnings 
variation is predominantly captured by the age related component when the growth rate heterogeneity model is 
adopted, so that suppressing this source of heterogeneity inflates shocks volatility.  
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coefficient σ
2
µ drops by more than 50%, while the growth of long term inequality is reduced to 
46%. Also, heterogeneity across cohorts in both earnings components is less pronounced after 
removing occupational differentials. Overall, these results suggest that occupation is a relevant 
element of long term differentials. As long as the long term component represents ability, these 
findings indicate that a relevant share of skill heterogeneity arises between occupational 
groups. Removing the effect of the other observable characteristics (columns 3, 4 and 5 of 
Table A2), also affects the size and growth of long term inequality (as should be expected), but 
the impact is not dramatic as the one of workers’ occupation.  
Another possibility for investigating the impact of observable characteristics is to directly 
specify them in the earnings model. Since Table A2 showed that occupation is the single most 
important factor in explaining long term inequality while less substantive changes in result 
occur for other observable characteristics, I will focus on modelling occupational differentials 
from now onwards. In particular, I allow long term earnings profiles to shift according to 
occupational status: 
it t c it it i it i it i i t ict v q a q a τ λ ϕ θ γ µ π ω + + + + = ) ~ (  (2.c) 
where qit is a dummy taking value 1 if the individual holds a non-manual occupation in year t 
and 0 otherwise, while  it it a a = ~  if ait≥30 and 0 otherwise.
28 The coefficients µi and γi now 
represent intercepts and slopes of individual-specific profiles that would apply if all individuals 
in the sample were manual workers. For non-manual workers, two additional individual-
specific coefficients apply. θi represents the shift of the overall profile that occurs for a non-
manual worker compared to the case in which he was a manual worker. For individuals starting 
their careers as non-manual workers, it represents idiosyncratic “initial” ability within the non-
manual earnings distribution, while for those changing occupation from manual to non-manual 
during the sample period it picks up the “step” occurring in the earnings profile due to such 
change.
29 ϕi represents the differential in earnings growth characterising non-manual compared 
to manual workers; since differential growth between occupations might be difficult to identify 
at early stages of the career, I allow the shift ϕi to apply after age 30.
30 
                                                 
28 White collars and managers are amalgamated within the group of non-manual workers. This choice is motivated 
by the tiny proportion of managers in the sample, which might complicate estimation of individual specific 
earnings profiles for this group. Cappellari (2000) restricts the attention to white collars and reaches conclusions 
similar to those presented in the paper. 
29 Recalling that changes of occupation are rather infrequent in the sample (see footnote 8), we can assume that in 
practice θi is a good proxy initial heterogeneity for non-manual long term earnings. 
30 Attempts at estimating the occupational differential since age 25 led to implausible results such as negative 
point estimates of σ
2µ and σ
2γ.  
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I assume that first and second order moments of individual specific coefficients are given 
by:  
)] 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , , , , , , ( ); 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 [( ~ ) , , , ( 2 2 2 2
ϕγ µγ ϕ θ γ µ σ σ σ σ σ σ ϕ θ γ µ i i i i .  (3.b) 
The variances of intercepts and slopes measure initial and life-cycle earnings 
heterogeneity under the hypothesis that all individuals were employed in manual occupations 





ϕ, capture the contributions to long term heterogeneity that arise within the earnings 
distribution of non-manual workers. The covariance of intercepts and slopes measure the extent 
of earnings convergence over the life cycle for manual workers, whereas the covariance 
between shifters indicates if patterns of convergence are amplified within non-manual careers. 
The four potentially identifiable cross-occupational covariances have been set equal to zero 
since when they were included among moments restrictions the minimum distance estimator 
encountered convergence problems.
31 
Second moments of long term earnings are now given by: 
} + + +
+ + + + { =
− − − − −
− − − −
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  (5.b) 
which clarifies how additional coefficients are identified thanks to the proportion and the age 
of non-manual workers contributing to the computation of empirical earnings moments. 
Table 3 presents results from the estimation of the model with occupation specific individual 
earnings profile. Allowing for occupational effects considerably reduces the variances of both 
intercepts and slopes compared to Table 2. The precision of the estimated σ
2
µ is also reduced. 
The variances of occupational shifters are both statistically significant at usual confidence 
levels. In order to assess the quantitative impact of these coefficients on earnings differentials, 
it has to be noted from equation (5.b) that their contribution to the estimated covariance 
structure is weighted by the proportions of non-manual workers in the sample. For example, 





Computed at the start of the career (when the average proportion of non-manual workers is 
21%) this quantity amounts at 0.0104+0.21*0.1414=0.04, which is twice its analogous in 





                                                 
31 Cross-occupation covariances are identified by individuals moving from a manual to a non-manual occupation. 
As illustrated above, there are few changes of occupational status in the INPS sample. This suggests that the 
available information is not adequate for identifying these additional coefficients and might explain the difficulties 
encountered in estimation.  
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amounts at 0.0002: although the proportion of non-manuals varies across ages – it is 29% at 30, 
36% at 40 and 29% at 58 – these variations are negligible in that at the fourth decimal digit 
slopes dispersion is constant across ages. Finally, the implied overall covariance between 
“intercepts” and slopes, computable as σµγ+(E(qit)+E(qi(t-k)))σθϕ, ranges from 0.0004 at age 30 
to 0.0002 at age 40 and again 0.0004 at 58; these latter computations however, are based on a 
rather imprecisely estimated covariance between shifters of intercepts and slopes. These results 
indicate that within the distribution of manual workers earnings profiles are more 
homogeneous compared to non-manuals, both at the start of the career and during the life 
cycle. On the other hand, the association between initial and life-time heterogeneity is more 
pronounced compared to non-manuals, suggesting that initial positions in the earnings 
distributions are a better predictor of life-time earnings. 
The introduction of occupation specific coefficients has an impact also on estimated 
coefficients in other parts of the model relative to Table 2. For example, the variance of initial 
conditions of the AR(1) is now smaller: since for birth cohorts that start the life cycle after 
1979 this coefficient is identified using the same information that identifies time invariant 
heterogeneity, the observed drop is a consequence of the larger overall dispersion of intercepts 
that can be picked up thanks to occupational effects. Another difference can be observed for 
calendar time shifters on the long term component, that are now smaller compared to Table 2, 
though their evolution remains unchanged.  
 
6 Concluding remarks 
In this paper I have used individual panel data to analyse earnings dynamics and inequality 
among Italian men between 1979 and 1995. Previous research on Italy has shown that earnings 
inequality grew in recent years and stressed that increasing flexibility and decentralisation in 
pay setting played a role in explaining these trends. The data utilised in this paper indicate that 
earnings differentials grew for most of the 1980s and the first half of 1990s. This rise has been 
accompanied by growing persistence, suggesting that the earnings distribution has become 
increasingly segmented. Relevant birth cohort effects also seem to be apparent both in the 
static and dynamic measures of earnings differentials, younger birth-cohorts being 
characterised by less dispersion and rigidity than older groups. 
The econometric analysis has been based on estimates of dynamic earnings processes and 
their implications for inequality. Results show that the driving force behind widening 
differentials is long term inequality, and that its effect works through two distinct channels.  
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First, initial earnings differentials are amplified over the life-cycle, as could be the case if those 
who have more schooling – and thus larger starting earnings– are also faster in learning skills 
on-the-job, thus experiencing quicker growth. Second, the overall distribution of permanent 
earnings widens since the second half of the 1980s, as could results from a shift of labor 
demand against the unskilled. Such an outcome is also in line with the type of wage policies 
implemented during the decade, which were aimed at re-establishing differentials in favour of 
skilled non-manual after the era of wage egalitarianism.  
Parameter estimates have next been used to assess the consequences of inequality for 
labor market segmentation by analysing low pay probabilities. I find that for individuals at the 
end of the earnings career low pay probabilities are almost entirely due to the long term 
earnings component, consistently with the life-time divergence of long-term earnings singled 
out by the minimum distance analysis. On the other hand, young cohorts witness a remarkable 
rise in the share of low pay probability that can be ascribed to the long run component between 
mid-1980s and mid-1990s, possibly as a result of the structural labor market changes discussed 
above. I also analysed the probability of sequencies of low pay events, showing that the 
remarks above also apply to the probability of repeated low pay events. 
Finally, I exploited the availability of workers occupation to condition the long term 
earnings component upon occupational status and found that life-time divergence is a feature 
on non-manual earnings career, while blue collar workers tend to evolve along homogeneous 
earnings profiles.  
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Table 1: Descriptive regression of the earnings autocovariance matrix (t-ratios
(a)) 
Lag structure    Calendar time effects    Birth cohort effects 
Lag       Year       Cohort    
1  -0.022 (84.62)   1980  -0.004 (3.10)    1933-35  -0.028 (2.60) 
2  -0.031 (91.73)   1981  -0.009 (6.10)    1936-38  -0.034 (3.32) 
3  -0.038 (95.13)   1982  -0.012 (7.39)    1939-41  -0.045 (4.56) 
4  -0.044 (94.96)   1983  -0.002 (0.86)    1942-44  -0.071 (7.42) 
5  -0.051 (95.52)   1984  0.002 (1.09)    1945-47  -0.107 (11.95) 
6  -0.057 (94.23)   1985  0.010 (5.33)    1948-50  -0.123 (14.05) 
7  -0.062 (91.95)   1986  0.015 (7.52)    1951-53  -0.137 (15.66) 
8  -0.068 (90.78)   1987  0.025 (12.38)    1954-56  -0.152 (17.47) 
9  -0.074 (88.33)   1988  0.032 (15.40)    1957-59  -0.175 (20.01) 
10  -0.079 (86.14)   1989  0.036 (16.42)    1960-62  -0.198 (22.63) 
11  -0.085 (84.39)   1990  0.045 (19.94)    1963-65  -0.229 (26.13) 
12  -0.090 (80.99)   1991  0.052  (22.15)       
13  -0.095 (78.15)   1992  0.061  (24.63)       
14  -0.098 (73.50)   1993  0.066  (25.46)       
15  -0.100 (66.14)   1994  0.078  (28.70)       
16  -0.105 (56.73)   1995  0.093  (30.73)       
Constant  0.244  (28.73) 
R2  0.99 
N. obs
(b)  N=67768; T×N=935333 
Notes: 
a)  Asymptotically robust t-ratios computed using earnings fourth moments 
b)  Observations used for estimating earnings moments, regression uses 1399 earnings 
variance and covariances 
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Table 2: Minimum distance estimates (asymptotic robust standard errors in parentheses) 
Long term component    Transitory component 
σ
2µ    0.0212 (0.0073)    σ
2ε    0.0148 (0.0033) 
σ
2γ    0.0002 (0.00003)    σ
20    0.0452 (0.0115) 
σµγ    0.0018 (0.0003)    ρ    0.9414 (0.0093) 
             
Year   Year 
1980   0.9725 (0.0075)    1980   0.8768 (0.0228) 
1981   0.9101 (0.0095)    1981   0.7650 (0.0296) 
1982   0.8591 (0.0108)    1982   0.7047 (0.0320) 
1983   0.8723 (0.0129)    1983   0.7164 (0.0351) 
1984   0.8477 (0.0142)    1984   0.6893 (0.0369) 
1985   0.8408 (0.0155)    1985   0.7039 (0.0395) 
1986   0.8353 (0.0165)    1986   0.6725 (0.0393) 
1987   0.8543 (0.0182)    1987   0.6700 (0.0412) 
1988   0.8455 (0.0193)    1988   0.6702 (0.0423) 
1989   0.8489 (0.0204)    1989   0.6037 (0.0405) 
1990   0.8560 (0.0215)    1990   0.6088 (0.0438) 
1991   0.8581 (0.0232)    1991   0.5936 (0.0449) 
1992   0.8918 (0.0251)    1992   0.5567 (0.0462) 
1993   0.8935 (0.0250)    1993   0.5368 (0.0500) 
1994   0.9745 (0.0265)    1994   0.4603 (0.0533) 
1995   1.0494 (0.0302)    1995   0.4077 (0.0634) 
             
        Cohort 
       1933-35   0.9402 (0.1608) 
       1936-38   1.1325 (0.1700) 
       1939-41   1.3716 (0.1762) 
       1942-44   1.3896 (0.1721) 
       1945-47   1.2120 (0.1461) 
       1948-50   1.2676 (0.1533) 
       1951-53   1.3109 (0.1591) 
       1954-56   1.3825 (0.1718) 
       1957-59   1.4227 (0.1846) 
       1960-62   1.4634 (0.1979) 
       1963-65   1.3955 (0.1988) 
SSR   0.0768 
χ
2(d.f.)   9284.0895  (1350) 
N. obs
(a).    N=67768; T×N=935333 
Notes:  
a)  Observations used for estimating earnings moments, regression uses 1399 earnings 
variance and covariances  
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Table 3: Minimum distance estimates conditional on occupational status (asymptotic 
robust standard errors in parentheses). 
Long term component    Transitory component 
σ
2µ    0.0104 (0.0077)    σ
2ε    0.0142 (0.0041) 
σ
2γ    0.00013 (0.00006)    σ
20    0.0309 (0.0101) 
σµγ    0.0014 (0.0008)    ρ    0.9311 (0.0108) 
σ
2θ    0.1414 (0.0411)         
σ
2ϕ    0.0004 (0.0002)         
σθϕ    -0.0016 (0.0014)         
             
Year   Year 
1980   0.9713 (0.0077)    1980   0.8220 (0.0347) 
1981   0.9046 (0.0108)    1981   0.7097 (0.0399) 
1982   0.8482 (0.0131)    1982   0.6634 (0.0391) 
1983   0.8607 (0.0163)    1983   0.6801 (0.0416) 
1984   0.8325 (0.0185)    1984   0.6707 (0.0436) 
1985   0.8222 (0.0203)    1985   0.6995 (0.0467) 
1986   0.8134 (0.0222)    1986   0.6639 (0.0456) 
1987   0.8303 (0.0245)    1987   0.6569 (0.0479) 
1988   0.8187 (0.0257)    1988   0.6634 (0.0495) 
1989   0.8145 (0.0272)    1989   0.5841 (0.0454) 
1990   0.8171 (0.0307)    1990   0.5897 (0.0499) 
1991   0.8147 (0.0324)    1991   0.5719 (0.0505) 
1992   0.8456 (0.0345)    1992   0.5157 (0.0507) 
1993   0.8318 (0.0379)    1993   0.5193 (0.0571) 
1994   0.8821 (0.0444)    1994   0.4548 (0.0594) 
1995   0.9302 (0.0541)    1995   0.4105 (0.0710) 
             
        Cohort 
       1933-35   0.9755 (0.2102) 
       1936-38   1.1357 (0.2144) 
       1939-41   1.3616 (0.2201) 
       1942-44   1.3750 (0.2187) 
       1945-47   1.1221 (0.1819) 
       1948-50   1.2051 (0.1946) 
       1951-53   1.2754 (0.2038) 
       1954-56   1.3788 (0.2226) 
       1957-59   1.4256 (0.2352) 
       1960-62   1.5354 (0.2576) 
       1963-65   1.6551 (0.2924) 
SSR   0.0731 
χ
2(d.f.)    8951.0160 (1347) 
N. obs.    N=67815; T×N=992218 
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Table A2: Minimum distance estimates removing the impact of observable attributes 
from raw earnings (asymptotic robust standard errors in parentheses) 
    Without controls     Controls for occupation 
   Long  term 
component    Transitory 
component    Long term 




2ε   0.1878  (0.0090)    0.0249 (0.0033)    0.0798 (0.0043)    0.0419 (0.0031) 
σ
20         0.0462 (0.0050)        0.0707 (0.0037) 
ρ         0.9348 (0.0050)        0.7374 (0.0056) 
                   
Year                  
1980    1.0014 (0.0071)    0.8162 (0.0202)    1.0205 (0.0080)    0.8465 (0.0161) 
1981    0.9673 (0.0087)    0.6853 (0.0228)    0.9924 (0.0097)    0.7742 (0.0210) 
1982    0.9355 (0.0097)    0.6376 (0.0239)    0.9530 (0.0105)    0.7696 (0.0237) 
1983    0.9793 (0.0109)    0.6416 (0.0258)    1.0078 (0.0117)    0.7784 (0.0248) 
1984    0.9779 (0.0118)    0.6180 (0.0263)    1.0109 (0.0126)    0.7538 (0.0257) 
1985    0.9898 (0.0126)    0.6465 (0.0282)    1.0224 (0.0136)    0.7784 (0.0274) 
1986    1.0058 (0.0132)    0.6240 (0.0278)    1.0634 (0.0144)    0.6908 (0.0231) 
1987    1.0479 (0.0143)    0.6359 (0.0290)    1.1010 (0.0156)    0.6922 (0.0239) 
1988    1.0549 (0.0151)    0.6525 (0.0301)    1.0853 (0.0163)    0.7597 (0.0264) 
1989    1.0786 (0.0167)    0.6053 (0.0287)    1.0963 (0.0172)    0.6673 (0.0218) 
1990    1.1051 (0.0178)    0.6276 (0.0304)    1.0877 (0.0183)    0.7179 (0.0252) 
1991    1.1364 (0.0196)    0.6173 (0.0305)    1.1045 (0.0191)    0.7146 (0.0238) 
1992    1.2055 (0.0218)    0.5988 (0.0308)    1.1202 (0.0200)    0.7162 (0.0243) 
1993    1.2368 (0.0249)    0.5844 (0.0313)    1.0829 (0.0208)    0.7454 (0.0258) 
1994    1.3681 (0.0270)    0.5496 (0.0310)    1.1435 (0.0218)    0.7903 (0.0282) 
1995    1.5194 (0.0360)    0.5134 (0.0335)    1.2274 (0.0265)    0.7568 (0.0283) 
                  
Birth 
Cohort 
                 
1933-35    0.9226 (0.0281)    0.9608 (0.0661)    0.9319 (0.0291)    0.9959 (0.0341) 
1936-38    0.8875 (0.0261)    0.9287 (0.0668)    0.8863 (0.0272)    0.9459 (0.0306) 
1939-41    0.8520 (0.0244)    0.9781 (0.0622)    0.8557 (0.0254)    0.9711 (0.0295) 
1942-44    0.7385 (0.0218)    1.1739 (0.0672)    0.8162 (0.0242)    1.0147 (0.0306) 
1945-47    0.6251 (0.0179)    1.1638 (0.0636)    0.7686 (0.0216)    0.9359 (0.0275) 
1948-50    0.5500 (0.0163)    1.2056 (0.0651)    0.7338 (0.0208)    0.9481 (0.0280) 
1951-53    0.5153 (0.0161)    1.1484 (0.0627)    0.7144 (0.0212)    0.9347 (0.0278) 
1954-56    0.4680 (0.0151)    1.1553 (0.0634)    0.6782 (0.0205)    0.9810 (0.0291) 
1957-59    0.4422 (0.0143)    1.0982 (0.0627)    0.6371 (0.0204)    0.9643 (0.0297) 
1960-62    0.3973 (0.0144)    1.0943 (0.0641)    0.5844 (0.0203)    0.9199 (0.0299) 
1963-65    0.3104 (0.0166)    1.1406 (0.0736)    0.5018 (0.0215)    0.8962 (0.0354) 
SSR   0.0596  0.0266 
χ2 (d.f.)   9069.9512  (1352)   7413.1262 (1352) 
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Table A2 (continued) 
    Controls for firm size    Controls for industry 
   Long  term 
component    Transitory 
component    Long term 
component    Transitory 
component 
          
σ
2µ;σ
2ε   0.1332  (0.0075)    0.0331 (0.0041)   0.1339 (0.0078)    0.0241 (0.0030) 
σ
20         0.0513 (0.0048)       0.0464 (0.0046) 
ρ         0.9076 (0.0052)       0.9199 (0.0048) 
Y e a r                   
1980   1.0127  (0.0080)   0.7806  (0.0210)   0.9865  (0.0091)   0.7920  (0.0195) 
1981   0.9931  (0.0103)   0.6635  (0.0246)   0.9710  (0.0112)   0.7058  (0.0233) 
1982   0.9733  (0.0115)   0.6245  (0.0262)   0.9412  (0.0128)   0.6841  (0.0255) 
1983   1.0094  (0.0132)   0.6354  (0.0280)   0.9597  (0.0143)   0.6777  (0.0272) 
1984   1.0095  (0.0142)   0.6064  (0.0281)   0.9547  (0.0157)   0.6709  (0.0283) 
1985   1.0249  (0.0155)   0.6474  (0.0304)   0.9719  (0.0170)   0.6977  (0.0303) 
1986   1.0368  (0.0162)   0.6180  (0.0292)   0.9862  (0.0178)   0.6868  (0.0302) 
1987   1.0709  (0.0175)   0.6351  (0.0301)   1.0044  (0.0190)   0.6895  (0.0309) 
1988   1.0632  (0.0187)   0.6736  (0.0316)   1.0255  (0.0204)   0.7207  (0.0325) 
1989   1.0748  (0.0203)   0.6334  (0.0301)   1.0425  (0.0224)   0.6879  (0.0317) 
1990   1.1070  (0.0218)   0.6616  (0.0317)   1.0835  (0.0241)   0.6988  (0.0328) 
1991   1.1400  (0.0239)   0.6536  (0.0316)   1.1085  (0.0259)   0.6989  (0.0330) 
1992   1.2077  (0.0265)   0.6433  (0.0318)   1.1635  (0.0289)   0.6829  (0.0334) 
1993   1.2581  (0.0301)   0.6327  (0.0314)   1.2059  (0.0330)   0.6742  (0.0340) 
1994   1.3413  (0.0329)   0.6378  (0.0321)   1.3150  (0.0363)   0.6579  (0.0344) 
1995   1.4545  (0.0425)   0.6193  (0.0336)   1.4151  (0.0468)   0.6392  (0.0371) 
Birth 
Cohort 
                 
1933-35   0.9253  (0.0538)   0.9691  (0.0336)   0.9855  (0.0595)   0.9189  (0.0336) 
1936-38   0.9497  (0.0533)   0.9216  (0.0316)   0.9738  (0.0575)   0.9029  (0.0322) 
1939-41   0.9221  (0.0489)   0.9085  (0.0297)   0.9990  (0.0536)   0.8541  (0.0297) 
1942-44   1.0533  (0.0525)   0.7984  (0.0267)   1.1204  (0.0579)   0.7725  (0.0273) 
1945-47   1.0424  (0.0498)   0.6750  (0.0219)   1.0923  (0.0542)   0.6466  (0.0228) 
1948-50   1.0709  (0.0508)   0.5846  (0.0195)   1.1376  (0.0559)   0.5621  (0.0205) 
1951-53   1.0348  (0.0493)   0.5247  (0.0191)   1.1052  (0.0544)   0.5022  (0.0205) 
1954-56   1.0233  (0.0497)   0.4604  (0.0178)   1.0996  (0.0550)   0.4557  (0.0192) 
1957-59   0.9475  (0.0484)   0.4354  (0.0175)   1.0343  (0.0540)   0.4406  (0.0187) 
1960-62   0.8991  (0.0469)   0.4066  (0.0182)   1.0079  (0.0537)   0.4077  (0.0196) 
1963-65   0.8873  (0.0546)   0.3384  (0.0219)   1.0284  (0.0620)   0.3324  (0.0240) 
SSR   0.0480  0.0454 
χ2 (d.f.)   8724.2180  (1352)   8425.3796 (1352) 
N. Obs    N=67768; T×N=935333    N=67768; T×N=935333 
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Table A2 (continued) 
    Controls for interfirm mobility   
   Long  term 
component    Transitory 
component   
       
σ
2µ;σ
2ε   0.1882  (0.0091)    0.0255 (0.0033)   
σ
20         0.0465 (0.0050)   
ρ         0.9355 (0.0049)   
Year           
1980   0.9877  (0.0072)   0.8021  (0.0202)   
1981   0.9583  (0.0088)   0.6830  (0.0230)   
1982   0.9220  (0.0097)   0.6349  (0.0242)   
1983   0.9662  (0.0111)   0.6379  (0.0260)   
1984   0.9623  (0.0119)   0.6118  (0.0265)   
1985   0.9768  (0.0128)   0.6459  (0.0285)   
1986   0.9946  (0.0134)   0.6198  (0.0280)   
1987   1.0323  (0.0145)   0.6360  (0.0292)   
1988   1.0404  (0.0154)   0.6521  (0.0303)   
1989   1.0626  (0.0170)   0.6059  (0.0290)   
1990   1.0946  (0.0181)   0.6251  (0.0305)   
1991   1.1281  (0.0199)   0.6163  (0.0306)   
1992   1.1902  (0.0222)   0.6000  (0.0311)   
1993   1.2314  (0.0253)   0.5794  (0.0313)   
1994   1.3599  (0.0275)   0.5449  (0.0310)   
1995   1.5124  (0.0365)   0.5123  (0.0336)   
Birth 
Cohort 
           
1933-35   0.9224  (0.0284)   0.9666  (0.0651)   
1936-38   0.8873  (0.0264)   0.9318  (0.0654)   
1939-41   0.8525  (0.0247)   0.9813  (0.0611)   
1942-44   0.7390  (0.0221)   1.1676  (0.0660)   
1945-47   0.6252  (0.0181)   1.1555  (0.0623)   
1948-50   0.5490  (0.0164)   1.1980  (0.0639)   
1951-53   0.5144  (0.0162)   1.1392  (0.0614)   
1954-56   0.4684  (0.0153)   1.1422  (0.0620)   
1957-59   0.4436  (0.0144)   1.0814  (0.0611)   
1960-62   0.3991  (0.0145)   1.0795  (0.0626)   
1963-65   0.3111  (0.0167)   1.1247  (0.0719)   
SSR   0.0621  
χ2 (d.f.)   10058.8950  
N. Obs    N=67768; T×N=935333   
 
 